This paper explores the role of multilateral transfers in achieving strict Pareto improvements in welfare, focusing on identifying conditions under which their use is warranted when carbon prices di¤er internationally and there are impediments to international trade. Acknowledgements: We are grateful for comments from seminar participants at the University of British Columbia.
Introduction
In a world economy in which there are trade and pollution distortions, the latter arising from ine¢ cient carbon pricing, the question arises as to whether there exist multilateral transfers of income (a key issue in climate change discussions and negotiations) that are strictly Paretoimproving in welfare. And, if they do exist, under what conditions? This is the theme of the paper: to explore conditions under which there exist international transfers of income that result in strict welfare gains to all participating countries, thereby partially ameliorating the negative welfare e¤ects of carbon price distortions in the presence of global emissions externalities.
The key task in this paper is to elaborate on the conditions that are necessary and/or su¢ cient to hold in the initial equilibrium for multilateral transfers to general strict Pareto improvements in welfare. This is a deceptively simple question but, as it will be shown shortly below, with an answer that is surprisingly not simple. On a more practical note, the analysis highlights an issue that has been very prominent in current discussions in climate change negotiations, and in particular with the nature of the responsibilities and actions countries need to take in relation to …nancial transfers to compensate for enhanced climate action. There is, of course, another way to state the problem. If, for some reason, the global economy is constrained in setting the Pareto e¢ cient carbon and trade tax instruments, can we nevertheless ensure that the use of multilateral transfers can generate welfare gains to all participating countries? This is the objective of this paper: to identify conditions under which this is, or is not, the case.
To this end, we construct a general equilibrium model of a trading world comprising many countries and goods in which production generates (carbon) emissions that result in global negative externalities on households. Within this framework, we consider three types of policy instruments -trade taxes (tari¤s), carbon taxes and multilateral income transfers. Taking trade and carbon tax setting as given, attention is turned to the role of multilateral income transfers in yielding strict Pareto improvements in welfare.
To anticipate the results that follow, what emerges is that Pareto-improving income transfers exist only if there are initial trade and/or carbon tax distortions. In this case, international transfers of income can be used to generate a strict Pareto improvement in welfare, even though the policy instrument being used is di¤erent from the ones that are causing the distortion.
The existence of strict Pareto-improving transfers is shown to depend on the violation of a generalization of a Hatta normality condition, the generalization taking into account the global externality created by carbon emissions and its general equilibrium impact on world prices and households. Strict Pareto improvements do not exist, unsurprisingly, if trade taxes and carbon taxes are set at their Pareto optimal levels. Nor do strict Pareto improvements exist if all goods are normal in all countries and the world substitution matrix (which accounts for the e¤ect of global emissions on compensated demands in all countries) exhibits net substitutability. 1 Assuming that trade taxes are Pareto optimally set (at zero) while carbon prices are not optimally set, it is proved that multilateral transfers are able to yield strict Pareto improvements in welfare. This theoretical possibility is illustrated through a numerical example.
The analysis builds on two strands of literature -one that has discussed trade and pollution reforms and one that has discussed the possibility of immiserizing transfers arising when a recipient becomes worse o¤ when the donor gives them resources (the latter taking place in a framework within which distortions from emissions are assumed away or, indeed, not part of the model).
The …rst strand of literature includes contributions in the theoretical literature that have addressed the linkages between climate (environmental, more generally) and trade policies.
Some of these studies have focused on non-cooperative policy formation, characterizing nationally optimal trade and environmental policies and the interplay between them as in, for instance, Markusen (1975) , Baumol and Oates (1988), Copeland (1996) , Panagariya et al. Kotsogiannis and Woodland (2013) , and Keen and Kotsogiannis (2014) . This latter literature has, in particular, characterized Pareto-e¢ cient allocations in which potentially three sets of policy instruments may be deployed: international lump-sum transfers, carbon pricing, and trade tari¤s. 2 The …rst set of these policy instruments is naturally directed to equity concerns, moving the world around its utility possibly frontier; the second set is naturally targeted to controlling emissions; and the third set would have no role if the other two instruments were optimally deployed. Attention has thus focused on the implications of various constraints on these policy instruments for the setting of the other policy instruments to achieve constrained Pareto-e¢ cient or Pareto-improving welfare outcomes. However, these analyses have been un-dertaken without delving into the conditions required for international lump sum transfers amongst participating countries to deliver (or not) strict Pareto improvements in welfare. 3 That is the focus of the current paper.
The analysis here also relates to the international trade literature that has analyzed the transfer problem, as in Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) . They considered the age-old question of whether a transfer of income between two countries necessarily bene…ts the recipient at the expense of the donor. In a general equilibrium model with many countries, they showed that interesting paradoxes can occur and, in particular, that it may be possible for multilateral transfers of income to improve the welfare of every country in the world, provided that there are trade distortions in the initial equilibrium. The transfers thus exploit the trade tax distortions to generate strict Pareto improvements. Their model, however, did not (and did not need to) consider the possibility of environmental distortions. In the present paper, we explicitly model global environmental externalities and show that Strict Pareto-improving transfers may exist when there are carbon tax distortions but no trade tax distortions.
The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 2 sets out the model of a world economy comprising many countries and goods and embodying global carbon emission externalities. Section 3 provides a general characterization of the necessary and su¢ cient conditions required for strict Pareto-improving international lump sum transfers to exist, while Section 4 then characterizes conditions required for international lump sum transfers not to exist. Section 5 provides an example that further illustrates the mechanism at work. Finally, Section 6 provides some brief concluding remarks. is an export subsidy (export tax). The domestic commodity price vector in country j is thus given by the N -vector p j = p + j . 4;5 The production of each commodity generates some pollutant with the N -vector z j denoting emissions in country j. 6 This formulation allows for emissions to be distinguished by the industry (product) of origin. Total emissions in country j are thus given by 1 | N z j , where 1 N is the N -vector of 1s and the superscript | indicates transposition. Global emissions, on which damage in each country depends, are thus given by the scalar
Pollution discharges in country j are subject to pollution taxes, given by the N -vector t j . Such pollution taxes are, in general, permitted to be sector (product)-speci…c.
The production sector in country j is competitive and characterized by a revenue function (with the standard properties of homogeneity, convexity and di¤erentiability), which takes the
where f j ( ) is the implicit production possibility frontier in country j, with v j being the vector of endowments and y j the vector of net outputs of traded goods. Notice, following from (2) -and as an envelope property -that 7;8
The consumption sector in country j is characterized by the (restricted) expenditure function
which is concave and linearly homogeneous in prices, increasing in utility u j and increasing in global emissions k. The last property implies that higher global pollution requires greater expenditure on goods to maintain the level of utility (the utility function is decreasing in k).
Shephard's lemma implies that the price gradient E j p (p j ; u j ; k)
gives the vector of compensated demands, whereas the scalar E j k (p j ; u j ; k)
is the compensation required for a marginal increase in global emissions. That is, it is the marginal willingness to pay for pollution reduction.
It will prove convenient to make use of the net revenue function, denoted by S j p j ; t j ; u j ; k and de…ned as the di¤erence between national revenues G j p j ; t j and expenditures E j p j ; u j ; k .
The net revenue function is
with the gradient vector with respect to product prices
giving country j's compensated net-export vector and the gradient vector with respect to carbon taxes
giving the pollution N -vector in country j. 9 Since u j and k only appear in the household expenditure function, the a¤ects of marginal changes in these variables upon S j are given by S Marshallian demand functions at the initial equilibrium. 10 Assuming that countries impose arbitrary …xed tari¤s on their net imports and carbon taxes 9 For the properties of these functions, see Woodland (1982) .
1 0 This follows from the fact that E
is the income derivative of country j 0 s Marshallian demand functions.
on pollution emissions, the world equilibrium is characterized by the system of equations
where, as noted earlier, p j = p + j .
Equation (9) is the national budget constraint in every country j, stating that the value (at world prices) of net exports (the trade balance) must be equal to a constant b j . If b j = 0 then country j has a zero trade balance, while b j di¤erent from zero implies a …nancial transfer from country j to the rest of the world. 11 Since world trade must balance in value, equation (11) must hold. The N equations in (10) are the world market equilibrium conditions for tradeable commodities, stating that the world excess supplies for these goods must be zero. Equation Prior to undertaking a complete analysis of the comparative statics of the model, it is instructive to undertake a preliminary examination of the model. Perturbation of equation (9) for country j with respect to world prices, transfers and global emissions reveals that
This shows how utility for a country j is a¤ected by an income transfer, a change in world 1 1 Equation (9) can also be written as
where the revenues (trade and carbon taxes) in country j are given (following (7) and (8)) by
This implies that expenditure in country j (for given global emissions k) is equal to GDP less any …nancial transfer b j to the rest of the world, plus any additional tax revenue R j returned to the consumer in that country in a lump sum fashion. prices and a change in global emissions. Thus, there are several e¤ects upon utility in country j. The …rst one, given by db j , is the direct e¤ect on utility in country j of an income transfer:
if p | S j pu < 0, a reduction in the transfer b j to the rest of the world (or an increase in the transfer received by j) confers a utility gain to this country. The second e¤ect, given by S j| p dp, is the familiar terms-of-trade e¤ect: if a change in international prices increases the terms of trade (S j| p dp > 0) for country j, then its welfare increases. The third e¤ect, given by j| S j pp + t j| G j tp dp, gives the change in trade and carbon tax revenues -respectively, j| S j pp and t j| G j tp -as the international price N -vector p changes, keeping utility, transfers and global emissions constant. If tari¤/tax revenue increases as a result of the price change, then welfare increases. The …nal term, given by p | S j pk dk, indicates that utility is reduced by an increase in global emissions since p | S j pk > 0.
Taking into account the fact that global emissions are a function of world prices, given tari¤s and carbon taxes, as denoted by
with price derivative
the expression (13) for the change in utility for a country j may be rewritten as
The last term in this expression gives the complete change in tari¤/tax revenue arising from a change in world prices, taking into account the impact of this change upon global emissions and the impact of this upon tari¤/tax revenue. The term S j pp + S j pk | p is the pollution-augmented net substitution matrix in country j, which gives the responses in the net exports to changes in the terms of trade, when consumer compensated demands respond to the endogenous change in global pollution emissions.
Equation (16) is central in the analysis that follows as it identi…es all welfare e¤ects that are associated with the transfers and their summation that determines total welfare. What this points to is that, at least in principle, a multilateral transfer of purchasing power across countries (even in the absence of trade distortions) could reduce the welfare of every country.
The …rst two e¤ects will disappear if the objective is the maximization of total world utility.
To see this -making use of (10) and (11) -the sum of (13) over all J countries gives
Clearly, (17) shows that if p | S j pu < 0; j = 1; :::; J; then a necessary condition for a strict Pareto improvement is for the right hand side of (17) to be negative. It is thus necessary that the world price vector alters so that the compensated world tari¤ revenue increases. If the right hand side is zero, such as when all countries have free trade and have zero carbon taxes, then a necessary (but not su¢ cient) for a strict Pareto improvement reform is that not all p | S j pu ; j = 1; :::; J; terms be of the same sign. The implication of this is that some commodities must be inferior in some countries but normal in others.
We next turn to the formal characterization of necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which there exits a multilateral transfer of income that will raise the welfare in every country.
Existence of strict Pareto-improving multilateral transfers
The analysis that follows proceeds by characterizing the conditions under which there exists a multilateral transfer of income such that there is a Pareto improvement in welfare, assuming that all tari¤ and carbon tax rates are given but taking into account the general equilibrium impacts of the income transfer upon world prices, world pollution and national utility levels.
Formally, the analysis proceeds by using Motzkin's Theorem of the Alternative to characterize the necessary and su¢ cient conditions under which a Pareto-improvement exists when multilateral transfers may be endogenously chosen.
The system (9)- (12) can be di¤erentiated with respect to utility levels, world prices, world pollution and income transfers at the initial equilibrium. This yields the di¤erential system
where the matrices A; B; C and D are de…ned by 13 ; dp 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 dp 1 dp 2 . . . dp N 
In these expressions,
is the world substitution matrix, which gives the aggregate world (compensated) substitution e¤ects on net excess supply of changes in international prices, p; in the absence of environmental changes, and
gives the negative of the change in global emissions due to changes in international prices, p;
and
gives the change in the compensated net supply vectors across all countries as a consequence of changes in global emissions, k.
Recalling from (14) that the impact of world prices on global emissions, given the trade taxes and carbon taxes, is given by the vector
the matrix de…ned byS
is the pollution-augmented world net substitution matrix, which gives the responses in the world net exports to changes in the terms of trade, when consumer compensated demands respond to changes in pollution emissions arising from the world price change. According to (25), changes in world prices a¤ect excess supply of products directly via S pp and indirectly via the change in consumption plans resulting from changes in global emissions. 14 Notice also that this pollution-augmented world substitution matrix can be written in alternative forms as 15
It will be assumed that the sub-matrix corresponding to non-numeraire goods j = 2; :::; N de…ned byS
is of full rank and therefore invertible. 16 Next we establish conditions under which there exists a multilateral transfer of income that will raise the level of welfare in every country j. A strict di¤erential Pareto-improving multilateral income transfer is de…ned as a transfer, db, such that (du; dp; db; dk) solves the di¤erential system (19) with du 0. That is, the income transfer, along with the general equilibrium changes in world prices and global emissions, yields an increase in the utility level for every 1 4 To see this in a clear way …rst notice that S j pk = E j pk and hence that S
The summation of this expression over all J countries gives
p . This, as stated in the text above, is the reduction in world consumption of goods due to the change in global emissions caused by the change in world prices for goods. 1 5 This follows from using (6) and (12), after using (8).
6S
qq is an important matrix and will be central in the analysis that follows. Invertibility of this matrix is a regularity assumption that allows a solution for prices -it implies that there is su¢ cient substitutability so the function is smooth and can be solved for the prices. country (du is strictly positive). The conditions for the existence of such a multilateral transfer of income are established using Motzkin's theorem of the alternative (Mangasarian, 1969 , p.34).
We perform a conventional normalization by …xing the price of commodity 1, ignore the market equilibrium condition for that commodity, following Walras'Law, and assume without loss of generality that the numeraire good is freely traded. Accordingly, it follows that 
with (28) holding with strict inequality for at least one country j.
Proof. The proof of the lemma makes use of Motzkin's theorem of the alternative and is provided in the Appendix.
While Lemma 1 provides the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for a strict Pareto-improving multilateral transfer to exist, we proceed to use this result to provide an alternative characterization that is more readily interpreted from an economics viewpoint. Equipped with Lemma 1, one can de…ne the country-speci…c scalars
Using this de…nition, we can establish the following characterization of the existence conditions. 
and with strict inequality for at least one country j, where j is given by (30).
Proof. The proof of the proposition is provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 has a clear interpretation. It is evident from the inequalities in (31) that if all
j have the same sign -either positive or negative -then a y 3 2 R that solves (31) does exist (and it can be either positive or negative, but not zero). In these cases, there are no multilateral transfers that can generate strict Pareto improvements in welfare. 17 On the other hand, strict Pareto-improving multilateral transfers exist when there does not exist a scalar y 3 that solves (31). This case occurs when at least two countries have non-zero j ; j = 1; : : : J; terms that di¤er in sign. What this implies in practice is that the existence of strict Pareto-improving multilateral transfers has been narrowed down to the sign structure of easily recognizable quantities de…ned by the country-speci…c scalars j ; j = 1; : : : J; in (30).
This result may be formalized as in the following corollary to Proposition 1. We have demonstrated that a su¢ cient condition for Pareto-improving multilateral transfers to exist is that there exist at least two countries whose j scalars di¤er in sign. This condition has an intuitive interpretation, and one that relates to the well-known Hatta Normality Condition.
To see this notice that for a small open economy j the Hatta Normality Condition is
which implies that all income e¤ects on net exports (weighted by the world N -vector of international commodity prices) are strictly negative. 18 In the present framework, however, things are di¤erent in the sense that our normality condition for country j is 1 7 The necessary and su¢ cient conditions in Proposition 1 involve a variable y3 that can be thought of as the implicit social marginal value of income, evaluated at the Pareto-e¢ cient allocation being characterized, common across countries. This interpretation follows from the formalities in the proof of Proposition 1 on noting that the conditions expressed there are equivalent to those of maximizing a social welfare function W (u) with marginal weights W T u = y T Zu (where Z is a matrix with elements from matrices A and D) with the typical elements being (after appropriate substitutions) W u j = y3 j (where j is given by (30)). This implies that y3 = W u j = j . 1 8 Notice that in this case (given the homogeneity property of the
which is equivalent to the de…nition for j in (30), wherê
As demonstrated in Appendix B, this last expression can be written alternatively aŝ
We call (33) the Generalized Hatta Normality Emissions Condition (GHNEC) for country j.
Here the income e¤ects on net exports are weighted by a 'shadow price vector',p, which accounts for the general equilibrium impacts of product prices on emissions and their subsequent e¤ect on prices. These indirect general equilibrium e¤ects operate through matrix p , which indicates how price changes a¤ect pollution, and S pk , which gives the subsequent e¤ect of the change in pollution on net exports.
The signi…cance of Proposition 1 (and its corollary) is that it provides a straightforward condition that can be checked when evaluating the impact of international transfers. This requires knowledge of the matrix S pq + S pk
together with S j pu at the initial perfectly competitive equilibrium. In principle, these matrices are observable marginal responses to prices and emissions.
We turn now to the identi…cation of conditions for the non-existence of strict Pareto-improving reforms.
4 Non-existence of strict Pareto-improving multilateral trans- Corollary 2 Suppose that tari¤ s and carbon taxes in every country j, j = 1; :::; J, are set at their Pareto e¢ cient levels (in the sense that j = 0 and
Then, if each good is normal in every country in the sense that S j pu < 0; j = 1; :::; J, a strict Pareto improvement in welfare from transfers does not exist.
Proof. The proof of the corollory is provided in the Appendix.
This corollary shows that strict Pareto-improving welfare outcomes from a multilateral transfer of income can only exist if tari¤s and/or carbon taxes are set at non-optimal levels. Besides this special case, the question that arises is: under what other conditions will a strict Paretoimproving transfer of income not exist? This is the question to which we now turn.
Following the analysis of the preceding section, if all countries satisfy the Generalized Hatta Normality Emissions Condition (GHNEC) then there is no multilateral transfer that can yield a strict Pareto improvement in welfare. Can we identify special cases of these conditions that have clear economic interpretations? In the following, we identify two such special cases.
The …rst special case is obtained by assuming that a change in global emissions does not a¤ect the household's compensated demands for commodities at the margin and in the aggregate.
If compensated demands (on the aggregate) are unresponsive to global emissions in the sense that
then the shadow price vectorp de…ned by (34) takes the special form
For this case, we arrive at the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume that compensated net exports are unresponsive to global emissions in the sense that S pk = 0; that the world substitution matrix Sis of full rank, that each good is normal in every country in the sense that S j pu < 0; j = 1; :::; J, and that all goods are world net-substitutes at the initial equilibrium. Then, a strict Pareto-improving transfer of income does not exist.
Proposition 2 re-con…rms a result in Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) in the present context: in the absence of pollution e¤ects on compensated demands and if all goods are normal in all countries and there is su¢ cient substitutability in the world substitution matrix then income transfers across all countries do not generate a strict Pareto improvement.
Our second special case goes in a quite di¤erent direction. Suppose now, going to the opposite extreme to the circumstances of Proposition 2, that production and consumption, on the aggregate, are unresponsive to international prices. In this case, we have the following result.
Proposition 3 Assume that there is no substitution in production or consumption in any of the J countries (and so, in the aggregate, S pp = 0), that the matrix S qk | p has full rank and exhibits net substitutability and that each good is normal in every country in the sense that S j pu < 0; j = 1; :::; J. Then, a strict Pareto-improving transfer of income does not exist.
Beyond its technical content, there is a practical element -related to the climate change discussions referred to at the outset -behind Proposition 3. In the presence of ine¢ ciencies from carbon pricing, normality and su¢ cient substitutability rule out the possibility of strict Pareto-improving welfare gains from income transfers. Negative o¤-diagonal elements imply that the e¤ects of a change in the price of l th good, through a change in global emissions, on compensated demands for good i is negative. To give an example, suppose that the price of airconditioning equipment increases (good l) and as a consequence more of this is being supplied.
Assume further that pollution intensity (on the aggregate) increases. What Proposition 3 requires is that compensated demand for heating equipment (good i) -either for each country j of for the aggregate -decreases. 19 Proposition 3 can be thought of as the generalization of Proposition 2 in Turunen-Red and Woodland (1988) . Things, however, are somewhat more complicated here due to the presence of global pollution, which a¤ects compensated demands.
An example
To illustrate the multilateral income transfer mechanism at work, this section presents a numerical example. The model has three commodities -with commodity 1 being taken as the numeraire with unit world price -and three countries engaged in perfectly competitive international trade. It is assumed that the countries all have free trade and have zero carbon taxes. 1 9 Notice that this does not preclude the possibility that the technology is one of …xed emissions (per unit of output), in the sense that G j t = z j = Ay j ; where A is a matrix with o¤-diagonal elements 0 and the diagonal elements If tari¤s are set at their Pareto optimal levels (zero) but carbon taxes are set sub-optimally (zero), the conditions for the existence of a Pareto-improving set of multilateral transfers simplify somewhat.
Importantly, in this case multilateral transfers provide a clear and only mechanism for ameliorating the welfare-reducing distortionary a¤ects of global emissions. The assumption of free trade implies that trade taxes are set at their Pareto optimal levels and so they do not constitute a reason why there might exist Pareto-improving transfers. However, the assumption that carbon taxes are zero implies that carbon taxes are not set at their Pareto optimal levels.
Accordingly, non-optimality of carbon taxes is the only policy setting that may yield Paretoimproving international transfers. The following numerical example illustrates a case where such transfers exist.
The initial equilibrium is characterized by the equilibrium world prices and various matrices of derivatives. We assume that the initial world prices are all equal to unity. Furthermore, we assume that the positive semi-de…nite world substitution matrix, the world S pk matrix and the matrix of national income e¤ects Since the vector b has elements of di¤erent sign, Corollary 1 implies that there exists a multilateral transfer of income that is strictly Pareto-improving in welfare for this world economy.
The direction of transfers is from countries 2 and 3 to country 1. All countries gain in welfare from the income transfers.
Other such examples may be readily constructed. Moreover, it is straightforward to construct examples that do not yield strict Pareto-improving welfare gains. In these examples the vector b has all elements of the same sign, so that all countries respond similarly to additional income. 
Concluding remarks
with (A.9) holding with strict inequality for at least one j (in (A.10), (10) has also been used). 
Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows the proof of Proposition 1. Since S pp = 0 by assumption, the shadow price vector de…ned by (34) may be expressed aŝ If S pk S tp exhibits net substitutability (all o¤-diagonal elements are negative) then S 1k S tq 0 and S qk S tq 
